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'l'his is a hrid in amieus euria(• filPd at tlw rpqu(•st
of' this Honora.h]P Conrt by fop Criminal Law SPC'tion
of thP l~tah Statl' Bar Assoeiation to try to assii-;t thii-;
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Court in an irnpartial mannn in <·onsid<'ring the petition
for_ extra-ordinary rdief filed hy the. Dis~rict Attorney
of the 1'hird .Judicial Distriet in thn StatP of Utah, seeking review of an Order by the Honorahl(• llenry Ruggeri,
District .Judge, suppressing fostimony ginm by C. W.
"Buck" Bradv, ,Jr. before the Salt Lake County Grand
Jury.
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STATEMENT O:F' .I<'AC'.1'8
'rlie facts as set forth in plaintiff's brief and

ru;

amplified in the brief of defendant sufficiently set forth
the circumstances of this case. C. "\V. "Buck'' Brady, .Jr.,
the Public Safety Commissioner of· Utah, was indicted
hy a Salt Lake County grandjury in December of 1965
(R. 61 ). 'l'hc indictment ~harged Brady with PJr'jurY in
the first degree, allegedly committed while testifying befo:re that same grand jury on August 16, 1965. At the
time of his appearance before the grand jury, Brady
indicated that he would like counsel. He was informed
t}iat the Statutes of Utah forbid the presence of counsel
in the grand jury room (R. 28). Brady then indicated
that lw wislwd to testify as a voluntary witness, even

without the aid of counsel (R. 29).

After the indictment was returned, Brady filPCl SPY<>ral pleas in ahatementand eventually moved tO suppress
the allegedly pt>rjurious testimony on tlw grounds that
:ht" had been deniPd his rights under Article l, Section 12,
of tlw Utah Constitution and Amendments '\y ~nd YI
of tlw Constitution of tlw UnitPd States. On ~fay 11.

1966;
·the' iH6norable
Henr~·H.ugget;i, ·defondant 'in till~
.., , r.
. , ,
.
.
,.

ma.th1 'r, entered on Ord1~r suppressing the tesfo.l~ony of
Brady ·as sd forth hi the indictment (R. 53-•"l-t-). ~~ron1
the foregoing Order the instant procPPding iss1wd, sePking- a n·view of thri rule.

POINT J
MAY THIS COURT REVIEW, BY AN EXTRAORDINARY
WRIT, THE GRANTING OF A MOTION TO SUPPEESS EVIDENCE AS A· FORM OF INTERMEDIATE REVIEW IN A
CRIMIN AL CASE.

From the earliest of ca.-.;eH in tlw State of .Ftal1 this
court has set down guide lines which have remaine,d llillchanged and unmodified. In People ·i:. l'an Ta~~sel, 1;~
lTtah 9, -t-3 P. 625, wherein this court stated at page 11:
''This effect or'a writ of mandamus is to compell
the 1wrformance of an act which the law specie.ally enjoins, and not to undo an act already
done." (Citing Ma.nl'ell v. Biirton, 2 Utah 595)
In State v. Booth, 21 Utah 88, 59 P. 553, our court
reiterated the above rule and further at page 94, noted
that mandamus did not lie whfre tl1ere is another speedy
or adeqiwte remedy.
Oene1;ally gpeaking, mandanius has been used in such
(·n,s<'s as State Ex Rel r. Moreho11se, et al, 38 Utah 234,
112 P. Hi!), to eomp('ll a pnhlie offi<'(:'l; to 1wrform an aet
\\·hpn a pnhlic officPr has a duty to ad. and discrPtion
cl<ws not pxist, i.P., th<' right of a litiµ;ant to liavP his
(·a.;:e s<'t for trial. (f'e<' also JJ11rris r. Turner, J1ulfJ<', 9(i

4

lHaJ1 :3+2, H;') P.2d 824.) A similar test of "·hether or not
review hy this eourt hy nwam; of certiorari is availablP
is discussed in Olson r. District Coiirt of. Salt Lake ' et al
~m l- tah 1+5, 7l P.2d 529, wlwrt>in this court in citing from
Ferris, l~'.rtra-OrrUnary Lega.l Remcd£cs, St>ction 157,
J>ag-p 17H, stated that certiorari would lie
)

"... when• no appeal or other adN1uate remPdy
i8 availablt>, and is appropriate in all such cases
where the sub8tantial rights of an applicant havP
been so· far invaded as to prejudicially effect him
if the proceeding or judgment remafos nnreversed."

In addition this court stated in Rohwer v. District Court,
41 Utah 279, 125 P. 671, that the granting or denying
of writs of certiorari are within the reasonable discretion
of this court and further went on to state

''It does appear that even though an absolute lack
or excess of jurisdiction (by the lower court)
cannot be shown, a writ can, and in practice, is
issued in the sound discretion of the higher court."

Rule G5 (B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedme
abolished the formal titles to the various conunon law
writs herein ref erred to and merely established the criteria that exhaordinar~' relief may be applied for
no otlwr plain, speedy and adequat~·
remedy exists, relief may be ohtainecl hy appropriate action under these rules .... "

"\Vlwn~

lllm;trative of sud1 a proePdure for intermediate review

5

h_\ this C'Ourt 1s State

Fmu, ~) l"talt :.M iJ.)0, J±.) P.2<l
18G, whl'rein this C'ourt frlt e0111pelle<l to n'viPw the prol'.

pridy of a Distrid Court .J udg<":-; ruling· prior to tlH·
adnal C'Olllll1Pnee111Pnt of a trial on th<· rnnit:-;. It would
tlwrefon' appear that undt>r Pxtraonlinar:· <'in·mn:-;hmet>s
un<lN t]H• gt-nt>ral gc1id<' linPs Pspoumh'd l>;· this eourt
from its VPl'_\" incpptio11 that UJ>On shm,·ing of unusual
C'in.'mnstanePs and in the sound disndion of this eourt,
n•view of an intPn1wdiate natul'<:> is availahlt· to a party.

POIN'l' I1
C. W. "BUCK" BRADY, IN CRil\TINAL NO. 19531, AS
FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, DID NOT ACQUIESE TO FURTHER INTERROGATION OUTSIDE OF THE PRESENCE OF COUNSEL IN THE EVENT HE WAS ENTITLED TO SAME.

'rhis point is raised rnerel:· as a prdaeP to the prin<'ipal issU<• hdore this Court as it does not appear to

lw iu11iartially discussed in ('ither of the advoeat<:>s'
hl'ids.
helieve the prime question for this eourt to
dPtide is raised in om Point III lwrein, that lwing the
right of Brady to hav<~ couns<'l ac('Olll}Jany him whPn h<>
was com1>elled to lw a witness before th<:> 1-)alt Lak<>
County Urand .J1u:· which was investigating as1wrts of
his aetivitit>s during his tenun' as a Salt LakP Count:·
( '01m11 i ssi on(•r.

·we

fn Jlfirm1r111 r. Ariurna, ](j LE:2d G9-t, at 707, th<>
l '11ih•<l Stat<'s Supn'lll<' Court laid do\\·11 a YPl".\" <'Ontl'OV<·1·sial rul<> of la\\· whid1 <'mphatiC'all)· appli<>s not onl)·

6

to police officers hut to prosecuting attorneys wherein
th{• court stated:

"lf, however, he indicates in any manner and at
m1y stage of the process that he ·wishes to consult
\\-ith an attorney lwfore speaking there Nin i.JB
no qupstioning." lDrnphasis ours.
under a different fact situation this
eourt in State v. Hamilton, 18 Utah :2d, +19 P.:2d '170,
decided appellant's rights to counsel had adequately lwen
protected, based upon the record before this court we
hPlieve it fair to conclude that Brady requested coun:,;el
and hased upon the statutes of this State the District
Attorn<~y advised him that he was not entitled to haw
counsr-1 aceompany him into the Grand .Jury Room while
lw was a witness. We, therefore, believe from a fair
Pvaluation of the record in light of Miranda. v. Arizo1w,
:mpra, that the principal question for this court to deh•nuine is that one discussed next in this hriPf.
Acknowlc~dging

POINT III
ADMISSIBILITY OF BRADY'S TESTIMONY GIVEN BE·
FORE THE GRAND JURY IN THE ABSENCE OF COUNSEL.

Historically, both the Constitution of the UnitPd
Stat<>s and tlw Constitution of Utah eall for the existence
of tlw grand jury. r. S. Const. anwnd. V; Ptah Con:-:t..
art. l, ~l:~; S<·<· f'nitul 8f(lfes 1·. Hill, :2G FPd. Cas. :l15,
:-n6 (No. 15,3G+) (C.C.D. Ya. 1809); Hurtado r. J>eo11l 1
of State of C(/lifornia, 110 F.f-i. 51<i, 5:-3-1: (188-t); Cnn1,/e,11
1:. F11it<'rl States, rn+ F.S. +m, +75 (190..t). rrhis insti

7

tution was, of coursf', horrowPd from our ~~ng-lish traditions and is vestPd with snhstantially thP sarnP powPrs
andd.ntiPs m; its historieal prototype. 8Pe 1Jl<1ir i:. l-nited
States, :2;)0 r.S. 27:1 ( 1919).
'l'he grand jury serves two 1mrposPs. One is to
incliet 1wrnons aecusPd of crime upon just grounds that
might he brought to trial. 'J'his is its inquisitoria1 function which still survvPs under the Constitution of Ftah.
'l'he other tradtional function of the grand jury is to
proh'ct against unfounded. prosecution by providing a
disinterested. d.etennination of probable guilt. This right
is set forth in the Fifth Amendment insuring that all
accused. will be charged. only U})On the concurrcnee of a
body of his peers -- the grand jury. See Orfield., The
Federal Grand Jury. 22 F.R.D. :143, 39-± {1959).
'l'he origin of the grand jury is somewhat obscure.
It antedates the development of trial by jury and has
its roots in the Anglo-Saxon system of frank-pled.g('
wherf'by the inhabitants of the realm were sureties to
thf' king for the good behavior o.f each other. Set> 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 114 (Lewis' f'd..); -l Blackstone,
Commentaries 273 (Lewis' eel). During t]w reign of
~~thPlred II (A.D. 978-lOlG), accusing bodies of twPlvt>
thanps t>xistl'd. for Pvery hundred. ThesP hod.i<>s wen•
<,onfinncd statutori]~y aftPr the eonquPf:t by tlw Azziz<>
of ClarPrnlon (A.D. lHiG) and laJPr in tlw Statute of
~orthharnpton (A.D. 1176). S0e E(hrnrds, Tl!<' (hand
Juri1 7 (190ii). ln 1:3GS dnring the -+:2nd yt>at· of th<' rl'ign

8
of l<Jd"-ard l II, le ,r;rrumde i11qncst was <'J'<•aU'd. This hody
c·onsish'd of a pa1wl of hn'nty-four knip:hts having jur
isdidion ovpr tlw entire rountry. Lik(• tlw a0cul'ing in<[lWl'b of tlH' hundreds, it was still iwcessary to hav<~
hYPln' lllPinlwrs eoncur. See Edwardl', Th,· Grr111d ./111y
2 (190G). Le gnmnde inqitest marks the real lwginning~
of the grand jury as -we know it today.
In the beginning the grand jury was probably designed to seeure the ends of the Crown. lt ·was not until
1681, during the reign of Charles 11, that th0 grand .im~

arose in defense of personal liberties and assmiwd it~
"second function" as protector of the individual from
the arbitrary power of the government. By virtuP of
two cases in that year, the grand jury laid lmsis to it:-:
i·ight to lH'ai· evid0nec' in private, apart from the eourt
and frpp from the influPnee of the ]Jl'OS<'Cutor. rrlw cas1·
of Steu11 Co1leqr: and tlw Rarl of h'lwfteslnuy cas<• ltaVI'
sinl'.e hePn proelai1rn•d as the h\-o. most cdehrat1'd instanePs of f<:>arlPl'l' action h>- tlw grand jury in dl'fpn:,01·
of lilwrt>-· S1•P J<~clwanls, 1'71<' Ornnrl Jury :28 (190G).
They hav<' alrn lw<·n eit<'d as the onl>- Pviden('<' of surl1
aetion. Sep AntPll, The Modern (-frnnrl Jur:11: Re11i:;llfed
Su1;eu;orernme11f, 51A.B.A ..L153, 15i'i (Fl·h. J!':)(i;:J) (s11ggl·sts that tliPsP juries Wl'l'P insnrn~dionary and prnlmlily
not tnw to their oaths).
Botl1 (;JmivillP and Bradon wrot<• of tliP Hl'C'Ut'atnr1
inquPsts; hm\-l'Y<'l', tlw first imliC'ation that the' 1ll'Ol'.<'<'d
ings \\'('J'(' to lw kl·pt s<•c·n·t is f'onnd in Bradon 's de
fcqil111s . N<'<' (;]nm-ilk ( !Jeu1111•s Tn111"luti011--f,1',!/U[ Clus-

sic Series)

19-L Bradon, de lcqifms (h'ir 'J'rr11·crs
'f'11iss ed.) 2-1-:1; 11M\rnnb, T71e C/ra11d J11i'JJ D-~5 (190G).
During Hradon's tinH• thP SPC'l'P('~· was not complet(•,
]10\\'PVPl', sinep the judges wt>n• fret• to inqui r<' n:-; to Pa<·h
nwmlwr of thP irnpw:-;t a:-; to tlw eaus1•s \d1ieh indneNl its
adion. As the right to trial by jury lwea11w establislml,
thP inquest no longPr dPtPnnined guilt or innoePnc·p and
it \\"as no longer necPssary for t11P jnsticPs to inquir0 of
tl\(' memlwrs as to thPir reasons. ThP Fltc1·1·11 Colle9c
and 8lwftcsln1ry cases also helped to t•stahlish the St·<TPr~· of the grand jury in·oc·t>Pdings and its in·progatiw
tf) act according to the dietatPs of its conscience.
~78,

·whatevPr tlw initial reasons for the secrecy requin·nwnt, this characfrristic has remained with the grand
jur~· to the present time. It has lwen praisPd as smucP
of tlw grand jury's independent power, see Edwards,
The Grand J11ry '27 (1906); ·Wickersham, The Grand
Jury: Wer1JJ011 A.r;ainst Crime rmd Corruption, 51 A.B.
A ..J. 1157 ( 19G5), and it has lwt'n the central tht'me of
111ost niticism of the grand jury. SN• Antell, The Mo.den1
(Jra11d .htry: Rrnighted S11prr.r;overn111r11t, 51 A.B.A.J.
153 (1965 ).
'l'h<'n· can he littlP question hnt that rtah Cock
,\nn. ~77-19-10 (1953) is tlw Pcho of the Rc>creC'y n•quirelll<'nt whi<'h was i111po:-Pd during Brae-ton's ti111P. HPePnt
1Jpinion:-; of this Court indieat(• a kPPn a\\·an•nt>f'S of fop
r1·a:-;011:-; justif:·ing :-neli a provi:-;ion. SPP 8to/!' I". F111u,
~J l" iali ~< l :~;io, :l-t;) P. ~<l rnfi ( 193~)) (I h•moid and Cal1i:-;t1·r,

.LT.,

<li~:-;1•nting).
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One aspect of the secrecy rule has concerned itself
with defining those parties who may be pres{mt during
sessions of tlw grand jury. lTtah Code Ann. ~77-19-9
( H););~) ('lllllllerates those ]Wrsons and the circumstames
undPr whieh the~· may he preRent. Mcyrrs 1;. SfCond Judicial Dist. ('ourt, 108 Utah 32, 15G P. 2d 711 (1945)
intt>rpi·t>tPd this S(~ction narrO\Yly and suggested that thr
]ffPl'wncP of an u11authorizPd person wonld invaliclatP an
in<lietnwnt n'garclless of prPjndice to thf) defendant.

The q1wstion as to who may he lll"esent before a
grand jury occupi<>d the attention of the federal courts
for almost a century. See Orfield, The Federal Gra110
.hiry, 22 F.R.D. ;143 (1959). The present federal position
is contaiiwd in Rule 6 ( d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
F'rocedure promulgated by the Supreme Court. 1'he conflicting fodPral decisions which antedate the Rules of
Criminal Procedure were written ]Jrimarily at the insistence of defendants moving to quash indictments becausr
of the presence of some deputy marshal or other unauthorized person in the grand jury room. Tending to
lean in favor of the defendant and in support of thr
sPcrecy requiremPnt, the courts continually rPstrictf'd tlll'
the nmnber of authorized persons. 'l'he theory and thnu;t
of tlw::-;e decisions eoncPrned the right of a cldendant
not to have an unauthorized pernon pn~~ent and tlw
right of tlw grand jury to conduct its proceeding in
st>nd. SeP l'11itcd States 1'. Recd, 27 Fed. Cas. 727,
7:3-t (Xo. Hi,1:)-t) (C.C.D. ?\.Y 1852) (intimatPs tlw nwn
Jll"PSPll<'<• of an u1ianthorizP<l ]JPr;.:on i;.: not fatal); f',11ited
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Stales r. Trrry, ;19 Fed. :fa), ;)(ii

(X.D. Cal. 188!1);
prPS<'nl'P of porter or ~wrvant not fatal); l"11ifl'rl States
1. Edqerto11, 80 F\•d. :n.i, 37:5 (D. 1font. 1S97) (indictlltl'nt slwnl<l lH· quaslwd whPn• PXJH•rt wihwss n·rnainPd
in jury room); ("11iterl Stall's r. Ifri112e, 177 F<><l. 770,
77:!. (8.D. X.Y. 1910) (a('<'onntant ma~· not hP im·sent
to aid pro~weutor - injury to dPfondant is i111111atl:'rial);
hut sPc l"nited States r. ~Wells. lG:~ FPd. :11;;, 327 (D. Ill.
1908) (prt>sencl' of enitt>d States attorm•y during deliberation was not nl:'CPssarily fatal); Cnitcd States L
Terry, 39 F'ed. 355, 356 (N.D. Cal. 1889) ( Fnih•d State:-:
attorrn•y's [lrl:'SPncP during opinions and voting is mt>rt>ly
an i rrPgulari ty).
It is int<>resting to nob• that until Congn•ssional
action in 190(} neither the Attorn<>y Ge1wral, tJ11.. Soli('itor
UPm•ral, nor any officer of thE' D<>partmc.. nt of .J usticl'
<'<mld pro1wrl~- appear befon• a federal grand jury. 3-1:
Stat. 816. See United States v. Rosenthal, 121 F'ed. 862,
873 (S.D. N.Y. 1903) (harm to the defendant need not
lw shown); United States v. Virginia-Caroli1w Chemical
Co., 163 F'ed. 66, 73 (1908).
\Vlwther or not a stenograplwr could he prPSPnt
hd'on· a frderal grand jury was also the subject of many
r·o.nflicting opinions until a statute in 193a provided for
thPir 1m•spn(·e. 1S P.8.C. ~55(i, -4-8 f-itat. 58. S<>c C11ited
,<..,'tofr's r. (ioldm1111, 28 F.2d -4-2-!, -4-2() (D. Conn. H)2S)
stPno1.?,Tapht•r was also a ht\\·yer appointPd as assi:-:tant
l'nitPd Stat<•s attonwy - indidnH•nt not valid); J,atlwm
1 .. r·11ifl'rl Stofl's, :2:!.(i F<•d. -1-:!.0, -4-:2:~ (Gtlt Cir. 1915) (('IPrk
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in offiee Of (-nitPd :-it-ates attonwy ('OU)rl not take Sb'TIOgraphic notes); hut see Wi!so11 1'. l r11iterl States, 229 Fed.
3-1-+, ;3-1-7 (2nd Cir. 19Hi) (stenographt'r <'onnected with
rn. tt'd Stafrs attorney's office allOWl'd to be pn'scnt ).
St><' also Wi!kes L l'nited States, 291 F('d. 988, 991 ((Jtlt
Cir. 1923), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 719; Halr~ r. { 'nitf'd
States, 25 F.2d -l-30, +3± (8th Cir. 1928) (tJw Gtlt and Stlt
Circuits permitted steno~~Taplwrn though not emmed('d
with office of United States attornPy). In viPw of the
rtigation which has taken plaee arnl the statutes whieh
have been enacted, one can say with wme certainty that
the statutes setting forth those who may properly lw
present before a grand jury are to he eonstnwd narrowly.
Utah Code Ann. ~77-19-9 (1953) condudes as follows: "No iwrson other than as in this section preserihed shall be permitted to be present during tltP
sessions of the grand jury; . . . " This statute dearl;·
indicates the intent of the legislature to vrohibit any
lJ>ther persons, including attorneys for witnesses summoned to ap1war, from attending.
Both the statP and fpdc'ral Constitutions JH'OtPct an
individual from sdf-inerimination. Both guarantPP him
the right to he rPJH'PSPnted ])y eounsel in a erirninal
prosecution. 1'lH·se rights haY<~ oftPn lwen di s<·ns:-:Pd in
<·onnPdion \\-i th a \\'i tnPss eom pell Pd to appear lJpfore
n grand jury. Tlw opinions liav<· rnadc· it tll'<H that
th<• grand jm·~- is not a <·mnt, r·ontrnr~· to th\' finding ol'
d<•frndant in this l'H:-i<' ( n. ~'-\). \\'itJi JJir• <1PY<']Op11WJlt
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of petty juries after the :Norman corn1uest and tlw pstablishm<>nt of right to trial hy ;jury, the grand ;jury has
r·eased to deterrnirn~ guilt or innocencP. l t is Hl('n•I)· an
a/·eusatory hody. [f the grand jury sought to weigh
evidence on hoth sidPs, it would in fad usurp the powprs
of tlH' eourt and the petty jury.
But for Utah Code Ann. ~77-20-3 ( 195:-3) tlwre would
bt~ no obligation to inform the aecu~wd of the witness
\\'ho appeared against him. See Wilson 1j. Unit<'d States,
221 U.S. 3Gl, 375 (1911). Tlw constitutional right to
confrontation does not include the right to confront witnesses hefore the grand :jury. Boehm v. United States,
123 F.2d 791, 80G (8th Cir. 19-H). 'l'he right to a public
trial does not apply to grand jUI")" proceedings. Unit<'d
b'tafr>s L Cc11tral Supply Ass'n., :34 F. 8upp. 2-H, 2++
(N.l). Ohio 19.J.O).
Utah Code Ann. §77-19-4- (1953) provides that the
grand jury shall not be bound to hear evidence for the
ddendant. This is consistent with the rule in the federal
court8. UnitedStatcs v. Blodgett, 30 1'-,ed. CaH. 1157 (No.
18,312) (S.D. Ga. 1867); see In re Charge to Grand .h1ry,
30 Fed. 1Cas. 998 (No. 18,257) (D. Md. 183G) (Chief
.Tm;tice 'l'aney). (Dt>fendant has no right to appear in
person or by counS('l, United States v. Palmer, 27 Fed.
Cai'i. -HO (No. 15,989) (D.C. Cir. lSlO); l'11itcd States
1·. L11111Jrosc, ;3 Ft>cl. 283, :287 (SJ). Ohio 1880); r'11ifed
Stof('s r. J(ilJJatrick, 1G F('d. 7G5, 7119 (\Y.D. N.C. 1HR3).
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tected by his constitutional right against iwlf-incriminati on. R ro wn v. Walker, Hil LT. S. 591 ( 189G) ; C ow1 selman v. llitclicock. 142 U.S. 547, :J32 (l8!l2). 1'he fed(•ral
conrts have held on many occasions, hmn·ver, that tlwr(•
is no obligation to warn a witnPss or 1uhis<' a wihw~~
coneerning hi!' ('onstitntional right. l :nited States r.
Charles, 25 FPd. Cas. 409 (No. l4,78fi) (D.C. Cir. 181:1);
Cnited States u. lVPtnwre, 2lS Fc>d. 227, 233 (W.D. Pa.
J 91+). rl'he courts have furtlwr held that a ·witness is not
PntitlPd to the aid of counsel whilf~ he is testifying before
the grand ;jury. !11 re Black, +7 F.2d 542, 543 (2nd Cir.
1931): f 11 re Shaw, 172 Fed. 520, 521 (S.D. N.Y. 1909)
( \\'.i tm~ss should have right to counsel after subpoena and
he fore testifying) ; se(~ also United States v. Winter, 348
.F.2d 20± (2nd Cir. l9G5), cer. den. :1s2 U.S. 955.
The federal eourts have been troubled, however, by
the distinction he tween a defendant and a mere witness
and have gt'n<"rally rf'quired that a defendant be advised
of his rights against self-incrimination. See Uniter/
Statrs v. Scully, 119 F. Supp. 225, 227 (S.D. N. Y. 195.t),
aff'd 225 F.2d 113, 116 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. dPn. 350 U.S.
897 (l95G): Pulford v. United Statrs, 155 F.2d 94-l, 9-!7
{Gth Cir. 19-tG): Cnited States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. G7+,
1;77 (S.D. N.Y. 1903); but sef~ UnitPd State,<; v: Parker.

:2-t-t F.:2d 9-t:1, 9-+7 (7th Cir. 19!57) (one t•armarhd h~
g-rnnd ;jun· for investigation should lw \rnnwd); Sta11fr.11
r. fTniterl Stutes, :2-+5 F'.:Zd 427, -t:H ((ith Cir. 19:J7) (011 1•
in <'nstody should he warnNl) . A ·wihwss ordinarily rna.1
not daim protf~dion as a d<>frndant, ho\\·pyp1·, nn!l'""
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there has heen an indictuwnt n•turnPd, or information
fi!Pd, or at least a complaint filed lwfon• a magistrafr.
SPe U11itcd States r. Kimball, 117 F'Pd. 15(i (S.l). N.Y.
l902); Maffic i:. l!nited States, 209 F.2d 22G, 2~1 (1st
Cir. 195-t-); Daly r. l'11ited States, :209 F.:Zd :2:l:2 (1st Cir.
195-!). HowevPr, in Cnitl'd States 'Z:. Edqerton, 80 F('d.
3'7-i (D. Mont. 1897), the court stated that an indietrnent
~hould hP quaslwd when it aprwars that tlw dPfrndant
was compelled by subpoena to attend hefon• the grand
jury, and give material testimony, without knowing that
his own conduet was under investigation. rrhe court did
not indieak whether or not the defendant had been previom;ly charged at the time of his testimony.
In United States v. Scully, 119 F. Supp. 225, 227
(S.D. N.Y. 195-!), .Judge ~1edina, speaking for the Second
Cin·uit, attempted to eliminate some of the confusion
which has grown from the witness-ddendant distinction.
In that case, a witness was compelled to testify befon·
a federal grand jury and was later indicted by the sanie
grand jury. The defendant then moved to quash the indictment on the ground that he had been "subpoenaed
to testify before the Grand Jury, that he did so testify,
and that although the 'auhorities had already marked
the defendant for prosecution, intended to indict him
and were engaged in bringing his indictment about,' he
was nevertheless not 'advised of his constitutional right
ag·ainst self-incrimination.' "

.Judg<:> Medina indicatPd

that tltP markPd witnPss eom·Ppt is hased on a fah:p an-

alo!.!,\ IH•h\ <'<'ll a gTand .ini·)·

pro(·<·P<li11g

and trial. 'f'liv
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right not to testify at trial was reall~· tI1e n•sult of a
statutory effort to remove tlw dt>fendant's ineapa«ity to
tPstify in his mrn defense in a criminal case which exiskd
under the C'ommon law. ':ri1en the defendant was madP
rompetent to testify in his own behalf, the statutes preserved the defendant's right to remain sil<•nt withont
prejudice, as provided in the Fifth A_1m•ndint>nt. Thi~
led to the further rule that the def<>n<lant may not lw
cal!Pd as a witness by the prosecution since to force him
to Pxercise his option in open court would in all likelihood
prejudice the jury beyond all possibility of repair. Some
courts then analogized that since the defendant could not
be called to testify at trial, he should not be called to
testify before a grand jury unless he is willing to be
a witnes:-; and waives his right to giv<> self-incriminating
h•stirnony. rriwse cas<>s conclude that there can be no
pffoetiw• waiver unless the defendant is properly informed of his rights and understands what he is doing.
.Judge l\[edina disagrees with this analo.gy and in so
doing states as follows:
"rl'Jwse eonsiderations do not apply to tht• inquisitorial proceedings of a Grand .Jury. Such a
body is not charw•d ·with the dnty of d<-eiding
innocen(•e or guilt and, for thi:-; reason, its pro('PC'dings hav<• m~ver he<'n eon<ludPd with tlw
assiduous n•gard for the ))}'esentation of )H'OCNlurnl i"~tfeguards whi<'h no.rmall.v att<>nds the ultimate trial of the issues. rrhu:-;, in such proc<~ed
ings, tlwn• is no right to couns<~l, no right of
eonfrontation, no right to eross-Pxamine <H' to
intrndnee <>vid<·nf'<' in rPlrnttal and ordinarily no
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requirement that the evidence introduced be onlv
such as would he adtnissihle upon a trial."
·
tfo qualifies his statement as dietmn, ho\YPVPr, :-m<·1·
8cully had not in faet been eharg<·d wlwn ]w tPstifiPd
before tlw grand jury and was therPforP not a "dPfrndant." ThP SPcond Cireuit did hold as follows, however:

"And so we now hold that the llH'n• possihility
that the witness may later be indicted furnishes
no basis for requiring that he h<' advised of his
rights under the Fifth Amendment, wlwn summon<'d to give testimony before a Grand Jury."
In the instant ease, Brady app<'ared bdore the grand
jury as a ·witness; that is to say, at the time of his
appearance he was no.t under indictment nor was he
charged by information or by complaint. It is true, however, that he had previously been charged by complaint
earlier in the year and although this matter was dismissed
by the magistrate at preliminary examination, the circumstances gave rise to widespread publicity. 'l'his incident was probably one of the reasons the grand jury
was called (R. 61-62). At the hearing before Judge Ruggeri on May 11, 1966, the district attorney admitted that
Brady was one of the persons "that th<~ State was shooting at in this case. He was the cynosun~ of neighboring
Pyes, so to speak" (R. 62).
Although tlw grand jury, as it Pxists in this state,

is primarily an inquisitorial hody, Brady wa.R et'l"tainly
sns1wet at th(' tiim• hP was askl•d to tpstif:-'. ThP l'Pcord
is ('l<'ar, lunn•v<T, that Brady, aftpr lwing ac1YisPd that
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eounsel eould not l>P prt=>sPnt during his tPstirnony, was
warn<><l and advised as to his right against s('lf-incrimination (R. 27-29).
In tlw d\:'fernlant's ord\:'r on motion to suppress, he
fotmd that the subject of inquiries befon~ the gran<l
jurors at the time Brady testified was whether or not a
crime had h\:'en <'Ommitted by Brady. He further found
that Brady was in fact in<lided for the idl'ntical ni11w:'i
\\·hich WPre under consideration. :?\lore important, .JudgP
Ruggeri found "that [Brady] was compelled over his
ohjection and in the absence of counsel, notwithstanding
his demand and request therefor, to give evidence against
himself as set forth in the indictment herein, ... " Such
a finding could only be justified either by it,rnoring the
tram;eript of Brady's testimony wherein he was properly
advised as to his rights or with the view tl).at the law
protected a witness in Brady's position from appearing
011 any of tlw follo,ving grounds:
1. rchat he was in fact a defendant and then~
fore had the right not to appear as a witness by
analogy to the rnle which prevails at trial (even
though Brady wanted to testify).

:2. 'I'hat this was a stage in his criminal prose-

<'ntion and therefore he was entitled to the aid and
assistance of c·ounsel in his <l0fens0 under hoth tlw
statP and federal Constitutions.
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to his right against splf-iw~rimination and his suhseqlwnt waivPr was i1wffrctivt- lweaus<· of his char~
ach•rization as an accused, since hP was not affordt1d
the aid and assistanc<> of eouns<'l (hy Pxtension of
the Supreme Court's rulings in Escobedo and Miranda infra.)

It is not clear from the defrndant's order as tn tlw
precise ground he relies upon. 'J'he effeet of the ordpr,
however, is to hold that a witness, though not charged
at the tinw of his appearance, is an accused if the grand
jury has reason to suspect him of wrong-doing, and any
warning or advice as to his constitutional rights is to
no avail unless he is afforded the right to counsel before
the grand jury. This, of course, by implication, holds
Uta.h Code Ann. W7-19-9 (1953) to he unconstitutional
and in fact, holds the grand jury itself to be unconstitutional as the rights and powers o.f that institution have
been defined since approximately the 13th Century until
tlw present time.
In 1957 the Supreme Court of the Cnitcd States
decided Jn re Groban's Petition, ;352 F.S. 330 (1957)
(Black, Douglas, and Brennan, JJ., and ·warnm, CJ.,
dissenting). That case involved a proceeding for a writ
of halwas corpus hy a ·witness who had lwen committed
to jail lweaus<• of his refusal to testify before a fire
11uHshal in a privah• investigation without ~hP right of
t·ounsPl. 'l'h<> Court indicatc•d that it was <'lPar that a
<lf'fPnclant in a statt> erirninal trial had an unqualified
right mHlPr tliP dlH' pro<'(•sc:; dau;:;p to ])(> n·pn•s(•ntPd h~·
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counsel. Thc-> Court Jwld, howev<'r, that the proceeding
before the fin• marshal was not a criminal trial nor
was it an administrative proceeding that would "in any
way adjudicate appellants' responsibiliti0s for the fire."
The court further stated as follows:

"Tlw fad that amwllants \\"<'l'(' under a legal
duty to speak and that their tPstinrnny might
provide a hasis for criminal elia1w·s against thmn
does not mean that they had a com;titutional right
to tlw assistanc-e of their counsel. Appellanti:; here
are witnesses from whom information was sought
as to the cause of the fire. A witness before a
qrand Jury, cannot insist, as a matter of constihdional right, upon being rept·esented by his counsel, nor can a witness before other investigatory
hodics." (Emphasis added.)

In this regard the court cited with approval In re Black,
-17 F.2d 542, (2d Cir. 1931) and United States v. Blanton,
77 F. Supp. 812 (D. ~Io. 19-l:S). The Court also cites
'vith approval Judge :Medina's oplliion in United States
v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1955); cert. den. 350 U.S.
897.
Justice Black's dissent in the Groba11 cai:;e is signifi.cant, since he does not disagree with the dictim of the
majority concerning the rights of a witnPS8 lwfore a
grand jury. Jm;tice Black, with whom Chief .Justi('<'
\V arrf'n and .J nstie<_'S Douglas and Br<>111um joirwd, statNl
as follow:.::

"To :-;npport its d(•<'ision that Ohio <"an puni:·dl
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a witness for rdusing to rnhmit to tit(• Firt> ::\farshal's S<'<·ret interrogation, the rna;jori ty plaC'es
heavy reliance on the practice of examining witnesses before a grand jnry in S('('TPt witho11t tlw
presence of the witness' eounsel. But anv surface
support the grand jury practie(~ may lP~d cfo.:appears upon analysis of that institution. '!'he traditional English and AmeriC'an grand jury is
composed of 12 to 23 mPmhers sdeckd from the
general citizenry of the loeality whert' tlu~ allc•gc•d
crime was committed.
"They bring into the grand jury room the PXperience, knowledge and viewpoint of all section:-;
of the community. They have no axes to grind
and are not charged personally with the administration of the law. No one of them is a pros<>cuting attorney or law-enforcenH•nt officer ferreting
out crime. It would be wry difficult for officer:-;
of the state seriously to abuse cw deceivP a witness in tlw presence of thl~ grand jury. Similarly
the presence of the jurors offers a substantial
safeguard against the officers' misrepresentation,
unintentional or otherwise, of the witness' statements and conduct before the grand jury. 'L1he
witness can call on the grand jurors if need he
for their normally 1mbiased testimony as to· what
ocenrrPd before them."

'L'he rPeord in the instant case evidences some coneern ovPr tlw J'p(•ent opinions of tlw Supreme Court concerning the rights of persons in police custody; however,
in his hri<>f tlw dt>frn<lant do<>~ n°'t placP any s1wcific
\H•ight on }<,'scohedo r. State of llliuois, 378 CS. 478
(1%-1-) Harlan,

~t(•wart,

ing:) or J/irn111711

Whitt> and Clark, .LT., dissent-

r. Ari201111, ;)S.+ l'.S. -1-36 (196G) (Clark,
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Harlan, StPwart and Whifr, .J..J., dissenting). The SnprelllP Court hPld that tlw statPments t>licitt>d from tlH·
dt-frndant by thP poliee at th<· stationhous<' eould not lw
usP<l against him at trial sin<·P at tlw tinw tlw statt>nwnt::-; \Wl'P madP tht- invPstigation was no longer a g<>n<>ral inquiry into an unsolYt•d eriuw hut had lwgnn to
foeus on Eseolwdo. The dt-frndant had lwen denied an
opportunity to eonsult with his lawyer and the polict·
had not pffrefrwly warned him of his absolute constitutional right to nnuain silt>nt. In Miranda, Chief .Tusticl'
\Yarren, :-;1waking for the Court, attempted "to givr
eoncr<.>te eonstitutional guidelint>s for law enforcement
ageneiPs and courts to follo"-" in connection with thP
applieation of the privilege against self-incrimination to
"in-custody intPrrogation." It is submitted that Escobedo
and Miranda arP aimed primarily at providing prop<•r
guidelinPs for police interrogation. See ·wright, The
Neu· Rnle of Defense Counsel Under Escobedo, 52
A.B.A ..T. 1117 (Dl'C. l9GG). They do not purport to modify the long line of decisions which define the rights of
a witness bt>fore a grand jury, nor do they in any way
infringe upon the g-rand ;jury's right to conduct secret
proceedings. It is true that .Justice White in his dissent
in Escol;edo stafrs as follows:
"ThP Fifth Amt>ndment permits upon prohahle cam;(• <·ven eornpulsory searelws of the su~
pect an<l his posspssions and tlw use of the fruit'
of thP sPareh at trial, all in the ahsPneP of <·ounsPL
Th<' Fifth Amenclnwnt and state ('Onstituti011al
provisions authorize, indeed n•quin•, inqnisitorial
grand jur~· lll'OC<><·<ling::-; at wlii('h a ])()h•ntial d('-
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f<:'ndant, in th(; absence of conrn-wl, i." l'hi(•ld1~d
against no more than cornpnll'ol'~' innimination.
Mullaney v. United States, 79 F.2d GliG, ms, ( C.A.
1st Cir.); United States r. fleu)11111i11. 120 F.:M G:!l,
.122 (C.A. 2d Cir.); r/nited 8f((tes l'. 8c11lly, :2:2;)
F.:2d 113, 115 (C.A. :2d Cir.); l'nift'd 8f((fes r. Gili!Oy, lGO F. Supp. +±2 (D.C . .Jl.D. Pa.). A grand
jury witness, who may he a SUl'}Wd, in intpnogated and his answers, at l(~ast until today, arP
adrnissiblP in evidence at trial. And tlwsP provision::; have been thought of as eonstitntional safeguards to persons susiwckd of an offrm;<:'.''
It is submitted, however, that tlH· Supn•me Court's opin-

ion may not be so far reaching as to ehangP the settled
proeedure of tlw grand jury and invaJidafo statutes such
as Utah Code Ann. ~77-19-9 (1953). The safeguards
founu in grand jury procedures as recognized by ;Jusi:ici:>
Black in his dissent in the Groba n case may still he valid.
[tis submitted that the Supreme Court could find a valid
<li:-;tinction between the interrogations of Escobedo and
,l/ iranda and the proceedings of tlw Salt Lake C01mty
Urnnd .Jury. In this regard, one should note that the
Conrt in Mira uda does not find a right to counsel in those
<'in·m11stanePs undl•r tlw Sixth Amendnwnt, hut rather
n•qnirr>s eouns<>l in ordt>r to secun~ a valid understanding and waivPr of tlw right against sPlf-incrimination
llll<l\•r tl11• Fifth .AnwnclmPnt.

'I'll<> dr>frndant in his hrid plaees great relianct• on
l'. Uy i II ff ton, 11-t nah :1ss, :200 P.:2cl 7:23 ( 19±8 ).
That <·asP has littk• similarity to the instant ease. In
Sin!<' r. flyiuq/011 th<> <h·frndant was (·0111rwlh•d to t<>stify
,')I(/ I I'
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in a eivil mattt>r lwfore thP court and was not warnt>d of
his right agairn;t self-incrimination. Tlw dt>fendant in
that east> made misstatt>menh; of fad in lit>u of answer~
which would have incrirninah><l him. Ht> was suhsequently chargPd with ]wr.jury. 1'lw Suprt>llW Court of Ftah
Jwl<l that th<• privilege against sPlf-incrimination prott->eted a witness as WPll as a party in a civil as wt>ll as
a eriminal matter. It furtlH•r held that the defendant'~
allt->gPdly iwrjurious ans,n•rs could not be used agairn;t
him in a suhsequent criminal trial, since he was not
properly advised as to his constitutional tights and the
only way he knew how to protect himself was to lie. This
was his layman's way o.f invoking the privilege.
The Six.th Amendment to the Constitution of tll!'
t'nite<l States and Article I, Section 12, of the Constitution of rtah, grants to a person the right to have the
assi8tanee of counsel in criminal prosecution. In considning the views (facts) set forth which may aid this
court in understanding the law which would no·t support
the decision of .Judge Ruggeri a fair conclusion would
he that these provisions are not in conflict with nor do
tlwy in any manner modify the equally important constitutional provisions which call for the creation of grand
juries and likewise, in no way limit or modify the powerR
or procedurt>s whieh have been carefully, through centuries of human history, judicial opinion and statutory
law.
Brady was not a ckfondant in tlw s<'nSP that tlwn·
was an outstanding <"rirninal (·harg-p on fil<' against hilll
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at the time of h;s te>stimo.ny and it may n•n,..;onably be
argm~d that even though he was a subject of inquiry, he,
without the aid of counsel, was not precluded from heing
<·alh•cl as a witness bt>fore the grand jury to t<•stify conl'eming his activities. To eonclude a<'('Ordingly would
TW<'PSsitate a determination that the grand jury is not
a ('Ollrt and that proceedings befon· such a hody would
not c•on::,;titute a criminal prosecution, nor a enstodial
typ<> of appearance where a witness though heing ahl<>
to invoke his privilege against self-inC'rimination is not
PntitlP<l to the other benefits affonh~d hy tlw law undPr
tlw theory of In Re Graban, supra.
llaving revi0wed the history and purposes of grand
juries from the extensive case law which has. given an
insight into the historical background and modern understanding of trends, it seems appropriate to point out
th<' eontroversial views as well as the possible impa~t
of SUJH'<'lllP court decisions rendered in the last sev<'ral years. First, however, in analy%ing this pro hlc>rn
from tlw standpoint of Judge Ruggeri 's decision being
rnrreet, it might be wise to recall certain constitutional
rights and statutory privileges 1wrtaining to eriminal
jll'O('<'dUl'P.
0

rl'lH• wording of Seetion I of the Fourteenth Arnendlrn•nt of the Constitution o.f thP United States, rwrtaining- to <'qnal protl'etion hy law; Artiele 1, SPction 12, of
tltc· Con:-;titntion of 1Ttah, protection of the accused from
an)· <'vidt'l1<'(' ag-ain:-;t himst>lf, codifiPd at 77-1-10, Utah
('o<l<· Amiotatc•d 195;) iwNl not lw n•1wah•d. A differenee
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m l'~ederal Practice and Ftah law is noted in Orfirld,
(.'ri minal Procedure U11dc r Federal Rules, Section 6 :99,
w]1prein t}w author notes in discussing Rule G:
"\'arious F'edt>ral immunit~r statuh•s protect
iwrsons tPstifying lwforp tlw Grand .Jury so that
they may s1:•curP dismis:-;al of indictim•nts against
them. 'YherP a witness beforp the Grand- .Jury
has lwt>n granted full immunity and the United
StatPs Attorney "rith the approval of tht~ Attorm~y General has appliPd for an order directin~
the witness to tt•stify, if the defendant disobey8
tlw order, he is guilty of contempt."
etah has no general granting of immunity laws, ln
rt> Co11tem7Jt of Neuman C. Petty, No. 10690,, ________ U.2d
________ , and has only a handful of specific instances wlwn
a defendant may be granted immunity from prosecution
and thPreafter compelled to testify, i.e. violation of
Liquor Control Act. There exists no means for a prosecutor or Court to afford a witness immunity from prosecution for possible incriminating testimony in the casr
in question.
The indictment obligation of our grand juries, so
far as is 1wrtinent to the instant case, states:
'I1he Grand Jury ought to find an indict111ent
when all of tlw PvidencP hefon' them, taken togetlwr, if unex:plainPd, or uneontradicted, \Yould,
in tlwir •J'ml(!'l.
iwnt
warrant a convidion lff
a trial
h
.
'
•
jury." 77-19-5, P tali Corle Annotated 195:3.

1
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12, Utah Code Annotated 1953) to (·murw1 tlw prt>smce
of witnrsses, which are defined as follmn::
"'\Vitness' shall includP a person wl1ose testimony is desired in any proceeding or investigation by a grand jury, or in a C'riminal adion,
prosecution or proceeding."
Section 77--15-11, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
And further, the jury may cite a rwrson for cont<>mpt
for dishonoring a subpoena (Sec·tion 77--±5-8, Utah CodP
Annotated 1953).
In correlating the position of Brady as a pt:rson under investigation, we know in Section 77-+.f-5, that:

"If a defendant offers himself as a witness, he
may be cross examined by the counsel for the
State the same as any other witness. His neglect
or refusal to be a witness shall not in arty manner
prejudice him or be used against him on the trial
or proceeding.'' (Emphasis ours.)

By oath, juries are obligated to inquire into and
'' ... true pn•sentment mah of all public offensps against tlw laws o.f this stat!', eommitted
or triable within this county... "'
~Pdion

77-18--t, fitah Code Annotated 1953.

It C'onld he reasoned that with their }W\\'C~l' to subJHH•na witnPsst-s, rPport 1n·oct>Nlings before them fnr use
in trial:-:; of indietecl 1wrsons, their ohligation to \n•igh
arnl l1Plilwrntt> on tlw c>vidPncP, in pffrct, find prnhahlL·
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caust> that a C'rime has lw<·n eonnnitted and that tlw indietc>d c01mnittc>d tlw sanw, a grand jury, in eRsence sit~
m tlw eapacit)· of a eomrnitting magistrate.
'l'lw Sta fr of X ew York has for man)· yearR dismis::wd indiehnents where the defendant gave evidence
against himself during the course of grand jury proceedings. Its Constitution, Artiel<> I, SC'ction 12, contains
l'.iimilar provisions to tlw Ftah Statc> Constitution and
rt'ads, so far as it is pertinent here:
" ... and in any trial in any court whatever
the party ac·cust'd shall be allowed to appear and
defend in person and with counsel as in civil
actions and shall he informed of the nature and
eausP o.f the a·0cusation. and be confronted with
the "·itnesses against him. No person shall be
subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense; nor shall hP be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.... "
In People r. 1'homasclla, 264 NY Supp. 2d 66, 1965,
the defendant had been named in an indictment chargingfirst degree> perjury before a grand jury, wherein he
was also indictPd for conspiracy to violate other certain
penal statutes. In relying upon People v. DcFeo. 131 NY
Supp. 2d SOG; and People 1'. Lmw, 218 NY Supp. 2d fH-7,
the New York Court stated:
"Fntil tltP Pnad11wnt in H.15:1 of SPction 2-t.fi
of the Penal LmY, L. 1%3, ch. 981 (generally similar to the immunity provisions of Rule G, J<\>dNal
Ruh•s of Civil Pro<·NlnrP) it was <'I Par that on1·
who was n•qnin·d to t<"stify lwfol'<~ a grand jnry
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eonef'rning tlw acts o.f others an(l in thP iiroeess
inci·iminatPs himself, has not had his }Jrivilege
violated unless he first asserts it, and it is overruled. On the otlwr hand, if 1h<· witrn•ss wa,-: <'Xmnirn•d conet>rning his own ads looki110· to a
criminal prosPcution against him for flio~<· ads,
his privilege was violated, even though h<> failed
to assert or claim his privik•g<'. (Citing Jll'o J!l<'
r. illette' 11 l NY Supp. 131, and oth<>r ('HSPS.)

a

"The effect of the violation of t]w privik•gt~
was that the witness' testimony might not be used
to ground an indictment for the substantive erirne
of which he was accused nor might lw lw }Jl'OSPcuted for any contempt or pPrjnry arising from
the testimony elicted in violation of witnt>ss' constitutional privilege." (Citing People 1-. Gillette,
supra)
"He did n.ot thereby gain an immunity from
prosecution for a suhstantivt> crime if an indictment was thereafter obtained on proper and competent tPstimony. (Gillette, supra)
Again, on

pag<~

812:

"'l'ht> distriet attorney elaims that DeFeo was
not a prospeetiv<' clefonclant. '\Ve cannot agree.
II<' a:;;:;;prts that it is apparent that DPFeo wa:-;
lH'ing qm•stiom•d in ordPr 'to obtain evidence
again:;;t his assoeiate and against tlwse who ac<·<·pfrd re ha t<•s and hrihes.' He asserts further
that anY doubt as to D<·F<•o's status as a witn<>ss
is n·1tu;v<·d h~· tlH' ('onfrning of irnunmit~- on tlw
witlrn(•ss pursuant to SPetion :2-1-,--1:7 of the P(•nal
Lnw, wliieh pn1·port<•dl~· o<·('llJTPd on th<• fourth
dm· of the tr•sti111onv. Whdher DPFeo. ·was a pros1H';·tiv<' <l<•frrnlant .is not to he <kt<·n11irn·d by a
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~ul1.i1·divt> Pxamination in the mind of thP pro;.;r
eutor. 'l'ht> sc·o1w of thP inqnir~- madP D<>FPo a
possihlP dPf Pndant. Th0 qu0stions addrPssPd to
him n•lat('(l to aets of his, dPnmninatPd criminal,
11nd1•r tlH' Criminal Lm,·. For the purpm.;p of appl~·ing tlw constitutional privileg<' DPFPo wa;.; a
prospt>divl' dPfendant. 'l'his is not a situation
\\'hPrP it is not clPar \\·ho ar0 the allPgPd \\Tongclcwrs, or who arP thos1· who know tlw fads. In
su('h a C'as0 the pros\'eutor may not know who arP
thP prospt>divP d0frndants. In this instanc<>, th('
rPeord is C'!Par, DPFPo was tlw targPt ev0n if pn
ehane1• lH' was not to lw the hull's eyP."

Jn tlw Lai110 eas1•, supra, th<' dPfrndant was required
to appt'ar with his hooks and records to givl' testimony
corn·Prning cPrtain puhlic corruption involving tlw purchasp of tir<'s by tlw Cit~' of l'tica. ]fr was specifically
infonrH'd that ht- was men•y a witnPss; that he was not
a <l<>frndant, hut that tire purchases from his busim's>
ent1•rprisP by tlw city \\·as under investigation. Although
not }wing indicted for any crime pertaining to official
corruption, Laino was indicted for state income tax evas10n, and at pagP ()55, Court statrs:

"As a pros1wctivf' dPfrndant, then, this d1·ft-ndant, togdlwr with his hooks and rPcords, wa'
snhpoPnaNl lwforr tlw lnv<·Htigation and th•·
Grand .JnrY, and Pxarninl'd in rl'lation to his 0\\"11
('ondud. T~1 sn('II a <·as<• tlH· snhp<wna is dl'l'llll'd
to h<• a form of ('Olllpnlsion, and th1• tPsti111on~- tl111'
<'OlllJH'lled may not lit' 11sl'd against cll'frndant a'
a basis of an indi('ht1<•11t, or for an~- otli<·r 1rnrpo~ 1 •·
This intP!'prdation of onr Statc·'s <·mrntitntional
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privilege ag·ainst self incrimination is well estahfodwd and is no longer open to quPstion."
Since the term "eriminal JH"OS<·<·ution '' may reasonahly lw <·onsiderc>d as a turning point of wlwther or not

a 1wrson is <'ntitled to the aid of <·omlsPI, an inn•stigation
into what that term means seem8 appropriat1>.
l"tah has ap1war<'d to conform with th1· <·arliPr gen1·rnl American rnlPs on tlw variou:-: ty]H'I' of instances
whi<'l1 might he ternwd a criminal prosPeution. 11 raditionally, as om• ·wonld d<·rive from tlw <'USPS nott•d in

Words and Plirr1ses, Habeas Corpus, violations of city
ordinances, inc1uiries hefore grand juriPs, ]Jl"OePPdings
in jnvPnile court, probation violations and preliminary
hParings in folony cases, eaeh, at one time or another,
have hl'Pn held not to eonstitute such, so as to Pntitle defrndant to aid of eounsel. Prior to the adoption by tlw
State of Utah of the Uniform Criminal l~xtradition Act
in substanee thirty yPars ago, it is 11 question whetlwr
th<· \n•ight of authority would have classified those pro('<•<•dings as a "criminal prosl'C·ution'' whPrein d<>frndant
11 a:-: Pntitl<·d to <·onnsPI. A po:-:sihle ClllT<'nt trPnd dPviates
t'rnrn th<·S<' Parli<'r <·a;.;ps, as <•videnePd l>y the following
illu:-:trntions: JlcDoiwld r. Jloore, :)3;) F:2d :2G:3; Harrey
1 • .lf issis.,·i fJ /Ji, :~-!-() F:2d :2<i:); ( eonstitnti on al right to eoun~( ·I in misdPm<·anor eas<'s); LeFa1·cr I'. Turner, .:z;n F.
:-;upp. ~!);i; ( rig·lit to <·onns<'l on halH·as ('Orpns proePl'd-

LE2d S-1-; },'.1· P!lrfe ,'-,'fate Rx
1!1'1 Fcl/lils, 17 So:2d -1--1-!l; f'. S. r. l/osfo11, :3:J3 F:2d 723:
l·.'11 !{(' ( '1111! rl'nl-". :2-1-1 P:2<1 1;:~1: Hl!lck r. l ·. S., ~:l:l F:2d
ing-:-:); K1'11/ r. {'. S ..

1(;
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10-t-; (1wrtaining to jun·nih·:-:'.rights to emmst>l in variou,
t)-JH'ii of juvPnile pro('PPdings); lT'illia111s 1·. Co111111n 11
wealth, 21() N1£2d 77!); (right to connRPl at parole anrl
n•voeation hParings); People 1'. Breeze, 213 N1£2d 500:
(right to (•ounsPl in 8anit)· eonnnitrnent pro{'eedings):
Rn Re .lol111so11, :198 P2d -t-20; (right to connsp] in traffo
offensPs).
Th<' l'. S. Comt of .App<:>als, 2nd Circuit, 19G5, U.S.
r. Wiufl'r, :1+8 F2<l 20-1-, may tend to adrnowledge thes1·
tr<>nds whl'n it ::-;tatPd, at page 207, after noting adhi•re11C'P to tlw long prPeidPnt of that circuit ·which runs in
dir(:'ct conflict to th<> ''targd of investigation" of N!:'w
York rulP and :;;ustaining the lower court bPcause ·winter
had PXJwc·tPd a waiver of immunity:
''"TJ11•tlwr or not reeent constitutional devt>lopments haw• drm,·n into question particular languagt• or authority cited in these decisions their
hasie fore<' r!:'mains lmimpaired." (Citing the
('USPS found on page 31 of plaintiff's brief.)
Orn• might argue that the Court of Appeals upholds
tlw vVintPrs convietion solely upon precident in that circuit and "·ithout the aid of the rnle invoked upon all
<'Ourts hY Jlf iranda i:. Arizona, :o;upra, and according!~·
nnd!:'rstand its apparPnt quandry in making the aboYe
quotPd statPment.
In C. b'. r. [>(lp]Jadio, ;~-t-G F:Zd 5, S, tlw Court not<-d

in sustaining dPfl.ndant 's <·onvidion of cont<>111pt of ('onrt
for failing to answer q1w::;tionf' pnt to lti111 nfhT a grunt
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,.i· inn111111ity in aceonlance with F<·dPral Hui<· of Criminal

l'roeednn· G, that had the que:.:tiu11:.: pnipoml(l<·d to deJ'('ndant hePn pertinent to tlw 1wrnling irnlidmPnt against
l1illl, th<' dPf<'nclant \\'Oniel eitlwr lw PntitlP<l to di:.:missal
111' that indictment or an Order Jll'OtPding Jii111 from the
1:'" of thos<· arnrn·ers in that trial.
Cm1rn·dicut, on tlw other hand, ha:.: a u11iqt1<• grarnl
i11r:< system, as is noted in the ea:.:<• of i'i'tafl' /'. Stalf inqs,
~()() At :!cl 277, which n·quin·s an i11did111<·11t in all <''11-il'S
11·hl·n· tlw possihle punish111Pnt is d<·ath or lif<· imprison111('nt. Tn that grand jury pro<·P<·ding:
" ... the ac·c·n:.:Pcl i:.: neitlwr inh·rrngatPd, put
1o plPa, nor p0n11itted to 11n'SPnt a clPfc.nsP .... "
In 111<• S<•11tP111hn-Odolwr issuP of '!'rial. a pnhliea11011 ol' tlH· ,\rnPri<'an Trial Law~«·r:.: "\s:.:oeiation, at pagt>
'\, 1s ;1 di:-wnssion uf n•<'<'nt h·gislation prnpost>d Ii~· fon11Pr
g"<1\·1·rnm· l•'<>JTPst<•r Furcolo. '!'his J<.gislation i1roposPS:

"'l'ltP aliolitio11 of a Sp1•<'ial Urancl .fur~· as a
-motivat1•d hod~·; 111on• mw of 'show
<·ausp' h<•arings h~· a jnclge for co111m1·n<·P111ent of
niminal ]Jl'O<"P<'<lings; and th<' inauguration of a
111onitor sysh•rn, or th<· right O·f · <·onns<'l within
th<· <;nrn<l .Jun·."
politi<'all~·

Th<' µ;1•11Nal prineiplPs liistoric·all~· clis<"nss<'cl l1PrPtolr1r1· in this hrid" c·on<'<•rning: sp]f-innirnination from its
1111·1·11t i11n in ]<;nµ;land, and th<' snh~<'qH<•nt abolition of the
~1ar l'l1<1111'11·r a11d tlH· Court of lliµ;h Cmmuission in
Ill~ 1, ;m• di-.:<·11:-:s1·d i11 Li Bu!'f"alo Lm\· HPYi<'\\' ;)!J;J, The

Prospectir<' D<'f<'11da11t Ru.fe and the Pr£vilcge Against
Self-!11cri111in11fiol! h>' Dirr.on and GPrard (1965); at pagi·
mo, tht- author:-; writ!':
"In eontrnst to inv(':-;tigation:-; 1wrformed Ill
pol i<·P, tlH• 0 rand .J nr>· proe('P<ling- i :-; a SP<'rf'i.
1'.r p11rfe inquisition wl1Prein a 1n·ose<·utor is al'rnys pr<'sPnt, and adiv<'l>- partieipatPs in and to
a la rgP ext<•nt eontrols pro<'l'edings. DPfrndant>
or wihw:-;s<'s an• not ]Wnnitt<•d to lw accornpaniPd
h>- cotmsPl in thr> Grand .Tur>r chambers. As if to
eorn1wnsatp for th<' unilatf'ral natun• of this stag1·
of tlw adion, a mon• Pxquisite degrep of judicial
s<>nsitivity ·with rt-sped to tlw right to he frn•d 1
from tPstirnonial cornpulsion is <'videnced by th1•
01wration of tlw strict exclusionary rulP. The rule .
is appliPd when a witnesR has heen compelled to i
inerimina<' hims<'lf by tlw US<' of judieial proers~
in violation of his privilege against sPlf-incrimination. \YIH•rp a Orand .Tnry investigation is ainwd
again:-;t a partieular individual in such a way that
it l)('eomp:-; appan'nt that thl· main objeetive is to
<'xtrad ineriminating evidencefrom his own lips.
tlw eourt eonsidPrs that lw stands in thP sa11H'
po.sition as a d<>frn<lant at hiR mm trial. Thi·
pffret of tlw violation of tlw "ritnessPs' privilq.~·1·
is thP :jndieial Pxclnsion of any testimony so corn- ,
pPlled and a dismi:-;sal of any ensuing indictment ,
hmwd upon such testirnony. Stated simply thi~
is tlw prMp<'etiv<> def Pn<lant rule operativ<> in eonn<'<'tion with th<' 0 rand .Jury lnvPstigatory proC'<'SI-'.
In <'ontrast with the law pnforePnwnt
inquiry, tlw witnPss llla>· hav1• full>· availed hi111
sPlf to his right to <'ommlt with <·ounsPl prior tn
l1is appPanuwP h1•fon· th<' (Jran<l .Tury, h<' lJHl'
hav<• lwt>n adYiSP<l in advan<·<· of th<' J>roe<·Pdin.~
of his priyilPg-1• to l'<'SJ>OJl(] to nn~- qtwstions if tl11
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answ('l't-1 tPnd to incriminate him and indeed ht>
may testify without ewr interpo8ing hi:-; privilege.
:N'<'wrthPless tlw courts will dit-1ti!ln\\· anv in('riminating testimony <>licted from J1im in ai~y suhse<pwnt proseention r1'sulting from thP invPstigation. ·with thP application of th<' prospective
<ldendant rnlP in the Grand .Tnry phaH•, judieial
!'('action againt-1t testimonial <·0111pnbion is eonspicnously more intense than at tlw ht\\· pnforcenwnt level. fTpn~ the touchstone to jndi('ial sPnsitivity is the concept of legal co111pnbion, Pxternalized in the subpoena.''
1n differentiating between statutory and eonstitutional immunity, the article states:
"'l'he crucial distinction bdwefm statutory imrnunity and the Constitutional <>xclnsionary rule
is that the former specifically accepts non-substantive crimes such as perjury and bribt>ry which
may lw eornmitted by the i1111nnnizt>d witness during the invPstigation, from its protective cloak.
Ho\\'PVPr, in tlw case of the \\·itness whose constitutional privih•ge has bePn violated because of his
sandifying status as a prospedivl' dl'frndant, lw
is prot1•etPd from any indiC'tn}('nt for Pither cont<·mpt or lH'rjnry, as \n•ll as any snhst.antive
< ri1w•, if such indiehnent is basPd in any rnannPr
upon th<' h•stimony eompelled from him."
0

.\ d!•l'init ion of' pros1wdin• defrndant through yarious
t1·st:-: toµ;(•tli!•r with th<• con('lnsion of" thP authors com1111·1w(•s at paµ;(' ()()9:
"II!' is silllpl;,- an~·o1w \d10 has not PX0cnted
a waiYl'I' of ill111111nih· and who has t<•stifo•d nndPr
oath li('l'on• a (;rnnA .Jury pursuant to :-:nhpoPna
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without i1111u 1.mi t:· and against whorn an inclid11wnt for a eri11w oth<'r than perjury and criminal
conte11qit has lwen rdurned. But if tlw witnes~·
PXP111ption is ac·eornplished as a result of a pn'snrnption that IH· wa:-; all tlw ti11w in fnd a prn~
)lPdiv<• dt>f<>ndant, th<'l'<' is no sound rPason for
dPn:·ing to him an PX<'111ptive status for perjnriou~
kstirnony or eont<>rnptuous eonduct whieh may
luw<> 1m't'Pd<•d tlw n•turn of tlw indictment for tlil'
suhstantivP ninw."
And furth<·r at fi09 and GlO:
''As a rn•c·<·ssar)· C'orollar)· to t1H' protectiom
e111hrae0d h:· th<> privih'g<' against self-incrimination, tlw Pxdusionary rule \ms clearly desigrn·d
to 01wratP as a lmhnnk against oppressive, inquisitional t<·drniques dt>signed to extrad dedara
tions of guilt from thm·w aceused or sus1wet<·d
of erirne. Tt is eontaimnent of prosecntorial and
inv0stigatorial ahusP of the immense pow<>r to
c·01n1wl testimony through the issuanc<' of eom1rnlsory j11dicial prnePss that is the essential amhition of th<' rule. 'J'h<•re is little justifieation for
de<·larin<r as ahnsin' tl10se dforts by an investigatory l~dy to obtain valuable infor;nation frnlll
]Wrsons who cannot rt>asonahl:' he east as sns]l<'ded or ac·ensc'd persons at the time of the exertion of tlw eompulsion." (The foregoing is an
<'XC'('rpt from "'l'lw Conseq1wnee 'J'Pst" in attempting to asc·Prtain \\'110 is a prospPetiv<' ddendant.)

In defining anotltPr possible kst tlw HPYi<'\\. Artiel(•
<'ntitles tli<' sanw, Th<· Pnis<•(·ntorial Constnwtion Kno11lPdge 'Test :
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whi<'h the }ll'08P<'Utor'f; knowledge of the witness'
f'tatus may he ohjt•ctivPly ascertained. The seope
of the inquiry way r<>nder a witness a possible
dPfendant and tlw (•lmwr the witness' calling is
idt>ntifo~d "-ith the seope of the inquiry, the more
(·orn1wllinµ; his status as a prospective deft.ndant
\\Till become. Once a reasonable nexus hetw0en
tlw witness and scope of the inquiry is establislwd,
a disclosnr<' in the minutes of the Grand .Jury that
tlw <'Xarnination rdated to the witness' ow~ <'Onduct and affairs will almost invariabh- n·snlt ill
the finding that the prosecutor 'must J;a-w• knmrn
in advance' that the witness was in fad a prospective defendant."
By way of conclusion, the article stated at pagP 613:

"It is difficult to escape the fact that tht• very
act on the part of the prosecutor in calling a
witness reflects a pre-supposition'that the ",ritness
is possessed of some knowledge OT information
of the subject of inquiry. This alone would se0rn
sufficient to place the individual close enough to
the subjeet of the investigation so as to justify
his classification as a possible defendant or at
least one in the target. By creating this classifieation of protected persons, whose boundary is today
as diaphanous as it \vas onc.e was rigid, the courts
have strieken the balance between the individual
rights and the investigatorial necessity in favor of
thP former. It is submitted that the result is
sound. By calling one who is judicially determinNl to be a pros1wctive d(•f <'ndm1t, at most the
prnst•eutor is allmn•d a single fish to <'lnde the
1wt ' and if t<'stimonv
.
. is addlH'Pd he has reeeiV('d
tlw Jw1wfit of information whi('li may lH_' sucet>ssfnl in i'lll'('Pssfnlly JH'OS('('Uting otlwr:::. Tt is the
-

· .~lc~asiun when tho \\·itm•ss rpfuse~ :txJ; ~1 st~fy with- out ass<>rting their,privilPg'(' ag-aingt.self~in~"rimin
ation, thus ]>reventing tlH-1 01wi·ation , of thi
: immunity statute, anrl are later held to lw PXPlll]>t
jxDlll contempt aetion because of the prospectiVl
<h1fendant status that tlw pro1'ecutor haH lost both
the:fish and the net."

.-\nd further:_
"vVit.h tlw knowlPdgP that the innermost srcr.f•tH of -hi~ inwstigation will he PXposed to th1' '
Hearing light of th<> defendant's serutiny, it i~
likely that tlw i8snan('e of every subpoena will hP
reviewPd \\·ith the greatest care - thus preserving 1
the integtit~· of the investigation and at the sanw
timP avoiding the violation of precion~ constitutional right" (Page l±, supra)
~

. ·-

In ~leshlwshtn-, Ri,ght,to.Cow1sel Before Gra111d JurJ/.
·1'wentiPth Annual Convention, American Trial Lawyer:'
Assoeiation, ,July 2±, 1966, th& author notes:
'

•

'

J

"WhatPVl'l' tlw hi·idge. Eseohedo and Miran<la

Jn~ilt lwtwe('n policP interrogation and t.lw privi-

ag-aim;t self-incrimination, no such bridge i~
nf'edPd to apply th<• privilege to grand jury pro
ceedings. As made plain at the outset, it is well
settled that the witness hefore the grand jury can '
·elaim the· privil<>ge, for su('h a witness can lw i
legally eom1wlled to anHwer and can lw held in
eonternpt for rPfusal to do so. '\YhatPvcr tlw
n•qnisitl' l<•ngth. intPnsity and 'eoercivPn<'ss' ol
polieP it1tl'n·ogatio11 lwfon• it c·a11 hP said that
the susp0d is !winµ: 'c·ompdlPd' to answ(']', as 11
practical matter, no (•om pa rahll' sign i fiean'.· 1•
attarlws· to the• kind of questioning eondnf'te(l Ill
lt>~P
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'the grand jury room. No eone1;ptual g:ap IJetwePn
the grand jury proceedings and the privilege
exist~ to he filled. In the g-rand jury room it is
mmeeesimry to eonsider \\'hL•tlwr misleading, unfair, abusive or (•o<:>reiv(• qlwstioning nndt>r 'color
of Jaw' lrnv0 prodm·Pd di' facto r·011ditions t•quivalent to legal e0111pulsion to an:-;\\·er, for in the
grand jury room a p<.•rson is nnd<>r l<'gal eompulsion to answ<'r; tlwr<:> is a legal obligation to which
the privil<>g(• in thP teelmieal spn:-;l• <'Un and does
apply."

In closing it seems appropriate to call this Court's
attention to. two decisions of the rnit<·d Stah·s ~upreme
Court on .January 16, 1967, striking down restrictions

impm;ed by statute .or. hy administrative bodies agaimit a
person's right to take the Fifth .A11Hmdnwnt. E(hrnrd
Garrity, d al, found X <'W .Jersey poli('e offic(•t·s lwing
cmupelled to te:-;tify in a state investigation eoneerning

<)ll<>ged unlawful aetivities as poliee offi('ers, and Samuel
:'lpe>vPek, a N<>w York lawyer, was disharred for invoking
tht• Fifth .Auwndment concerning his dealings with his
'diPnts. In the Garrity case, the eoerced confessions were
thl'own out and Spew"{·k was reinstated.
CONCLrSION
Crirninal Law St>ction, in pn·paring this advisory
li1id, J1a:-; attPwptecl to do so without rPcommendation
a~ to eon<'lnsion and without taking any position Pither
1·()r or againt-1t

tlw dt>ei:-:ion of the llonorabl(• lfrnry Rug-

\\'p ltav<· :-:Pt out, as eomplt>tt>ly and as hwidly as
po:-;~ildP, Jat<·r <'HH'=" frorn Yarions juri!'clietious for th<·

~ni.

lwnefit of tl1t• ('ourt and fePl that thL·>· adPqnatPly ex.plain
tlw tn·n<l ()f la"· in rnath•r:-; of this typP.
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